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NOTES
Doing Good the Wrong Way: The Case for
Delimiting Presidential Power Under Executive
Order No. 11,246
I. INTRODUCTION
The purge of discrimination is a national goal of the highest
order and calls for commensurate best efforts. The eradication of
employment discrimination and its effects justifiably' has been of
paramount concern not only to Congress, 2 which is charged with
formulating and implementing national goals, but also to the Exec-
utive Branch, which since 1941 has issued a series of executive or-
ders dealing with the subject.' These executive orders were the fed-
eral government's only action on the employment discrimination
1. Senator Humphrey explained the overriding need for equal employment opportunity
in -the fight against discrimination: "Without a job, one cannot afford public convenience
and accommodations. Income from employment may be necessary to further a man's educa-
tion, or that of his children. If his children have no hope of getting a good job, what will
motivate them to take advantage of educational opportunities." 110 CONG. REc. 6552 (1964).
2. See, e.g., Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1976); Age Discrimination Act of
1975, 42 U.S.C. §§ 621-639 (1976); Civil Rights Act of 1870, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976); Civil
Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1976); Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1976); Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976); Civil Rights
Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (codified in scattered sections of 18, 25, 28, 42
U.S.C.); Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-216, 86 Stat. 103
(codified in scattered sections of 5, 42 U.S.C.); State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of
1972, Pub. L. No. 92-512, tit. I, 86 Stat. 919 (codified in scattered sections of 26, 31 U.S.C.)
(amended 1974); Vietnam Era Veterans' Readjustment Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-540, 86
Stat. 1097 (codified in scattered sections of 38 U.S.C.); Vocational Rehabilitation Act of
1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
3. The key executive orders that have addressed the problem of employment discrimi-
nation are as follows: Exec. Order No. 8802, 3 C.F.R. 957 (1938-1943 Compilation); Exec.
Order No. 9001, 3 C.F.R. 1054 (1938-1943 Compilation); Exec. Order No. 9346, 3 C.F.R. 1280
(1938-1943 Compilation); Exec. Order No. 10,210, 3 C.F.R. 390 (1949-1953 Compilation);
Exec. Order No. 10,227, 3 C.F.R. 739 (1949-1953 Compilation); Exec. Order No. 10,231, 3
C.F.R. 741 (1949-1953 Compilation); Exec. Order No. 10,243, 3 C.F.R. 752 (1949-1953 Com-
pilation); Exec. Order No. 10,281, 3 C.F.R. 781 (1949-1953 Compilation); Exec. Order No.
10,298, 3 C.F.R. 828 (1949-1953 Compilation); Exec. Order No. 10,308, 3 C.F.R. 837 (1949-
1953 Compilation); Exec. Order No. 10,479, 3 C.F.R. 961 (1949-1953 Compilation); Exec.
Order No. 10,577, 3 C.F.R. 218 (1954-1958 Compilation); Exec. Order No. 10,925, 3 C.F.R.
448 (1959-1963 Compilation); Exec. Order No. 11,114, 3 C.F.R. 774 (1959-1963 Compilation);
Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965 Compilation), reprinted as amended in 42
U.S.C. § 2000e app., at 1232 (1976); Exec. Order No. 11,375, 3 C.F.R. 684 (1966-1970 Compi-
lation); Exec. Order No. 11,478, 3 C.F.R. 803 (1966-1970 Compilation); Exec. Order No.
11,758, 3 C.F.R. 841 (1971-1975 Compilation); Exec. Order No. 11,830, 3 C.F.R. 936 (1971-
1975 Compilation); Exec. Order No. 11,914, 3 C.F.R. 117 (1976 Compilation). The current
orders are also collected and reprinted in 2 EMPL. PRAc. GuiDE (CCH) 3675-3765.
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front until the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 4 They also
have gained increased importance as antidiscrimination weapons,
in part because they sometimes impose greater duties on employers
than does existing legislation.'
Executive Order No. 11,246 is the currently operative order re-
lating to employment discrimination.' The Order and the regula-
tions promulgated pursuant to it7 (hereinafter referred to jointly as
the "Executive Order Program") apply to most contractors and
subcontractors of the federal government.' The Order mandates
4. Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, 78 Stat. 253 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to
2000e-17 (1976)).
5. For example, in Title VII, §§ 703(a) and (d) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibit
employers from discriminating in hiring on the basis of race, color, sex, religion, or national
origin, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a),-2(d) (1976), and under § 703(j) an employer cannot be re-
quired to grant preferential treatment to minority members, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1976).
In comparison, Exec. Order No. 11,246, § 202, 3 C.F.R. 339, 340 (1964-1965 Compilation),
reprinted as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e app., at 1232-33 (1976), provides that each gov-
ernment contract contain inter alia the following clause:
During the performance of this contract, the contractor agrees as follows:
(1) The contractor will not discriminate against any employee or applicant for em-
ployment because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. The contractor will
take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed, and that employees are
treated during employment, without regard to their race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin. (emphasis supplied).
The requirement of affirmative action contained in the Order goes beyond the scope of Title
VII because under the implementation program, see note 7 infra, the Order expressly im-
poses on employers an obligation to adhere to quotas and timetables for attaining statistical
minority representation in the work force-a kind of preferential hiring system not counte-
nanced under Title VII.
6. 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965 Compilation), reprinted as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
app., at 1232 (1976).
7. Exec. Order No. 11,246, § 201, delegates to the Secretary of Labor the responsibility
for administering the Executive Order Program. The Secretary has delegated this responsi-
bility, in turn, to the Director of the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs
(OFCCP), 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.2 (1979). With Revised Order No. 4, 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-2.1 to .32
(1979) the OFCCP has established affirmative action requirements for nonconstruction con-
tractors. (Construction contractors are regulated by the separate provisions of 41 C.F.R. §§
60.4.1 to .9 (1979)). Revised Order No. 4 requires each contractor and subcontractor to sub-
mit a written affirmative action plan within 120 days after the commencement of a contract.
In the event of "underutilization," the plan must specify numerical goals and timetables for
increasing the minority representation in the employer's work force. The regulations define
"underutilization" as "having fewer minorities or women in a particular job group than
would reasonably be expected by their availability." 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.11(b)(1979). The cure
for underutilization is affirmative action "appropriate to overcome the effects of past or pre-
sent practices, policies, or other barriers to equal employment opportunity." Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission, 29 C.F.R. § 1608.1(c) (1979). The appropriate action speci-
fied by Revised Order No. 4 is the preferential hiring of minority members to meet the
numerical goals determined on the basis of the underutilization analysis. See Lopatka, A
1977 Primer on the Federal Regulation of Employment Discrimination, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 69,
121-25 (1977).
8. Exec. Order No. 11,246 applies to employers who are federal contractors doing
$10,000 or more of federal business per year. 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.5 (1979).
EXEC. ORDER NO. 11,246
that the "contractor will not discriminate against any employee or
applicant for employment because of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin" and that he "will take affirmative action to ensure
that applicants are employed, and that employees are treated dur-
ing employment, without regard to their race, color, religion, sex or
national origin. The Executive Order Program further requires sta-
tistical representation of minorities in an employer's work force.'0
The breadth of the Program with its concept of affirmative action
and concomitant requirement of preferential hiring contrasts so
markedly with the straightforward antidiscrimination provisions of
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act" that commentators and
courts have vigorously questioned the Program's validity.' 2
At the heart of the debate lies the question of the source of
authority for Executive Order No. 11,246. That question is ulti-
mately one of separation of powers. This Note focuses on the au-
thority of the Executive to issue Order No. 11,246; it explores sev-
eral previously unexamined perspectives and discusses policy
considerations for defining limits to the Executive's exercise of
power. The Note concludes that the order, in its current breadth,
may not survive as a valid exercise of Presidential power if it is
challenged as a violation of the fifth amendment,' or Titles VI or
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.14
I. ANTIDISCRIMINATION EXECUTIVE ORDERS AND THE QUESTION OF
ExEcurIvE POWER
A. 1941-1960: The Early Executive Orders
The series of executive orders aimed at eliminating employ-
ment discrimination predates federal legislation in the area.'5 Be-
tween 1941, when President Roosevelt issued the first such order,
and 1960, these executive orders were modest in scope; the author-
ity under which they were issued was clear and undisputed. The
early orders proscribed discrimination by government defense con-
tractors. President Roosevelt's Executive Order No. 8802 required
9. Exec. Order No. 11,246, § 202, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965 Compilation), reprinted as
amended in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e app., at 1233 (1976). See note 5 supra.
10. See note 7 supra.
11. See note 5 supra.
12. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 99 S. Ct. 1705, 1719 (1979).
13. U.S. CONST. amend. V. At stake are the equal protection and due process rights of
minority members as defined in Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
14. Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, 78 Stat. 253 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to
2000e-17 (1976)).
15. See notes 3-4 supra and accompanying text.
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that all government defense contracts physically embody a clause
stating that the employer-contractors would not discriminate
against their employees on the basis of race, creed, color, or na-
tional origin.1" Subsequent orders allowed for incorporation by ref-
erence of the antidiscrimination clause 7 and extended the applica-
bility of the clause to all government contractors.'" Later orders did
not further expand the scope of substantive coverage, but reallo-
cated the responsibility for contracting and enforcement among va-
rious federal agencies.19
Presidents issued the early orders pursuant to the war mobili-
zation powers of the Executive. On their face the orders derived
their authority from the various War Powers Acts and Defense Pro-
duction Acts passed between 1941 and 1950.21 This authority was
never seriously challenged.2' Some courts2 2 also viewed the early or-
ders as authorized by the Federal Property and Administrative Ser-
vices Act of 1949,23 which gave the Executive power to issue policies
and directives necessary for the procurement of goods and services
by the federal government. 24 These courts premised this view on
the existence of a connection between the executive order nondis-
crimination provisions and the government interest in insuring that
"its suppliers are not over the long run increasing its costs and de-
laying its programs by excluding from the labor pool available mi-
nority workmen. '25
Thus, since the employment discrimination executive orders of
the 1940s and 1950s were narrowly conceived and bore a direct rela-
tion to an explicit grant of statutory authority, there was a direct
connection between their provisions and the authority upon which
they were issued. Consequently, there was never any serious ques-
tion as to their validity. Such has not been the case with the post-
16. Exec. Order No. 8802, 3 C.F.R. 957 (1938-1943 Compilation).
17. Exec. Order No. 9001, 3 C.F.R. 1054 (1938-1943 Compilation).
18. Exec. Order No. 9346, 3 C.F.R. 1280 (1938-1943 Compilation).
19. E.g., Exec. Order No. 10,210, 3 C.F.R. 390 (1949-1953 Compilation); Exec. Order
No. 10,479, 3 C.F.R. 961 (1949-1953 Compilation).
20. E.g., Exec. Order No. 10,308, 3 C.F.R. 837 (1949-1953 Compilation). This Order
was issued expressly under authority granted by the Defense Production Act of 1950 and the
appropriation authority granted by 31 U.S.C. § 691 (1976).
21. See Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159, 168-71 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971); Note, The Philadelphia Plan: A Study in the Dynamics of
Executive Power, 39 U. CH. L. REv. 723, 725 (1972).
22. E.g., Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159, 170 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971).
23. Ch. 288, 63 Stat. 377 (codified in scattered sections of 40, 41, 44 U.S.C.).
24. 40 U.S.C. §§ 471, 486(a) (1976).
25. Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159, 170 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 854 (1971).
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1960 orders, particularly those postdating the Civil Rights Act of
1964.
B. 1961-1980: The Later Executive Orders
In 1961 President Kennedy issued Executive Order No.
10,925,6 which greatly expanded the substantive scope of the Exec-
utive Order Program. The expanded scope of this and later orders
raised questions about the basis for the authority upon which they
rest. President Kennedy's Order initiated the "affirmative action"
provision found in the later orders, requiring the contracting em-
ployer not to discriminate and to "take affirmative action to ensure
that applicants are employed, and that employees are treated dur-
ing their employment, without regard to their race, creed, color, or
national origin." The order also augmented enforcement author-
ity, increasing the impact of the program on federal contractors.
Executive Order No. 11,246, originally issued by President Johnson
and subsequently amended without significant change,2 is cur-
rently in force. The Order retains the affirmative action mandate
and adds a proscription against sex discrimination in hiring." Pres-
ident Johnson's Order also expanded the scope of coverage by re-
quiring that the nondiscrimination and affirmative action clauses
apply not simply to employment "[i]n connection with the per-
formance of work under this contract," 0 but to the employer's ac-
tivities "[diuring the performance of this contract."'" Thus, while
President Kennedy's Order required compliance only in those areas
of the contractor's operations directly connected with the work nec-
essary to fulfill the federal contract, Executive Order 11,246 now
requires compliance in all the contractor's operations as long as he
is under contract to the federal government.
Beginning with President Eisenhower's Executive Order No.
10,479 issued in 1953,32 none of the subsequent employment dis-
crimination orders derived authority expressly or impliedly from
the Executive's defense powers. Because they refer to no specific
26. 3 C.F.R. 448 (1959-1963 Compilation).
27. Id. § 301, at 450 (emphasis supplied).
28. Part I of the Order has been superseded by Exec. Order No. 11,375, 3 C.F.R. 684
(1966-1970 Compilation) and Exec. Order No. 11,478, 3 C.F.R. 803 (1966-1970 Compilation).
29. Exec. Order No. 11,246, § 202, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965 Compilation), reprinted as
amended in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e app., at 1233 (1976).
30. Exec. Order No. 10,925, § 301, 3 C.F.R. 449 (1959-1963 Compilation) (emphasis
added).
31. Exec. Order No. 11,246, § 202, 3 C.F.R. 340 (1964-1965 Compilation), reprinted as
amended in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e app., at 1233 (1976) (emphasis added).
32. 3 C.F.R. 961 (1949-1953 Compilation).
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statutory33 or constitutional 3' grant of authority, these orders by
their own terms raise the question of Presidential authority for
their issuance. Some courts have agreed with the Third Circuit
that "[w]hile the orders do not contain any specific statutory refer-
ence . . . they would seem to be authorized by the broad grant of
procurement authority with respect to Titles 40 and 41.1 31 Other
courts and commentators, however, have criticized the Third Cir-
cuit for not treating the issue properly as one of separation of
powers."
The separation of powers and executive authority disputes
have intensified in the wake of passage of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. Courts and commentators traditionally have focused on the
potential conflict between Title VII, which appears to proscribe
preferential treatment of job applicants and employees by govern-
ment contractors,37 and the affirmative action requirements of the
Executive Order Program, which call for preferential employment
practices in some instances. 8 Courts generally analyze the question
within the framework set forth by Justice Jackson in the Steel
Seizure Case,39 focusing only on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.
As detailed in Part V of this Note, a new analysis of the conflict
between the Executive Order Program and Titles VI and VII could
lead to the conclusion that the expanded Executive Order Program
falls outside the scope of the proper exercise of Presidential power.4"
33. E.g., the preamble to Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965 Compila-
tion), states that President Johnson issued the Order "[ulnder and by virtue of the authority
vested in [him] as President of the United States by the Constitution and statutes of the
United States."
34. For a discussion of this issue see Note, supra note 21, at 726-32, and Part III. B.
infra.
35. Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159, 170 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 854 (1971).
36. Note, supra note 21, at 732.
37. See note 5 supra.
38. See note 5 supra. At least one commentator has observed that
[t]he use of the goals and timetables is not intended to be "rigid and inflexible" and
thus "reverse discrimination" should not occur against any qualified applicant or em-
ployee. However, as a practical matter reverse discrimination may still result because
of the administrative burden entailed by the failure to meet goals and timetables ...
Hence, it may be the path of least resistance for an employer to treat his "goals" as
though they were quotas.
Comment, Executive Order No. 11,246: Presidential Power to Regulate Employment Dis-
crimination, 43 Mo. L. REV. 451, 466 (1978) (citations omitted).
39. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). Justice Jackson's
"three categories" are outlined in Part V. A. infra.
40. See Part V. infra.
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III. THE SOURCES AND NATURE OF THE PRESIDENT'S
AUTHORITY FOR ISSUING EXECUTIVE ORDER No. 11,246
A. Constitutional Sources of Authority
The power of the President to issue an executive order must
derive from either the United States Constitution or from an act of
Congress that grants the President authority that is within the
power of the Congress to delegate.4 Article II of the Constitution
gives the President no express authority to issue Order 11,246. Two
sections of the article, however, appear to offer a source of implied
authority. First, the President swears to "preserve, protect, and de-
fend the Constitution of the United States."4 If, for example, gov-
ernment contracts with employers who practice discriminatory hir-
ing violated the fifth amendment due process clause of the
Constitution43 and Congress had provided no solution to the prob-
lem, then the President's oath of office could serve as a basis for
the exercise of Presidential power in this area. Congress, however,
provided a solution by enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Fur-
thermore, a distinction must be drawn between a ban on Presiden-
tial complicity in private discrimination and an affirmative obliga-
tion of the Executive to seek out and redress all race- and gender-
based imbalances in the work force of federal contractors." Conced-
edly, courts have stretched the concept of state action to attribute
to the government much conduct that was formerly considered
purely private. Recently, however, the Supreme Court has re-
treated from its expansive state action decisions by increasingly
characterizing activity as private and therefore not subject to con-
stitutional scrutiny." Thus, the imposition of affirmative action-
41. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
42. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8.
43. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
44. A 1971 Seventh Circuit decision illustrates this distinction. In Gautreaux v. Rom-
ney, 448 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1971), the court held that the transfer of federal funds to a local
agency that openly practiced racial discrimination was a breach of the fifth amendment.
Thus, it is not legal for the Government to fund discriminatory programs. Funding discrimi-
nation, however, is quite different from the unilateral enforcement by the executive branch
of hiring goals and timetables in order to erase the effects of societal discrimination. The
Executive Order Program does not rely on specific discriminatory acts as evidence of dis-
crimination. Instead, it looks only to "underutilization." 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.11 (1979).
45. See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth.,
365 U.S. 715 (1961).
46. In short, "[t]he state action concept no longer appears to reflect an expansive phi-
losophy of pervasive government responsibility for perceived social inequities; recent deci-
sions seem inclined to permit and even protect an area of private sector conduct for which
governmental accountability. . . will be attenuated." Havighurst, Blumstein & Bovbjerg,
Strategies in Underwriting the Costs of Catastrophic Disease, 40 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB.,
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preferential hiring requirements on private parties who contract
with the government can no longer be justified on the positivistic
notion that government has an affirmative constitutional duty to
correct "underutilization" in the work force of its contractors.
The second possible basis for implied constitutional authority
is the article II mandate that the Executive "shall take Care that
the Laws be faithfully executed." 7 An executive order issued to en-
force existing legislation would derive authority from this mandate.
Commentators and courts have had difficulty discovering exactly
which legislative goals or provisions are being furthered by Execu-
tive Order No. 11,246.11 It is therefore doubtful that section 3 of
article II provides the necessary constitutional authority. Moreover,
the section 3 language quoted above should not be read as confer-
ring any powers of autonomous action on the Executive. The broad
language comes at the end of a list of specific, enumerated Presi-
dential powers and should be taken as an interstitial delegation of
dependent power, serving the same housekeeping function as the
necessary and proper clause in article L"
If the Constitution grants no express or implied authority for
Executive Order No. 11,246, the next question is whether any in-
herent authority may be inferred from the general powers of the
President." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer5 is the most
instructive case dealing with the inherent powers issue. Because a
United Steelworkers Union strike threatened to curtail steel pro-
duction crucial to the Korean war effort, President Truman issued
an Executive Order directing the Secretary of Commerce to seize
and operate the steel mills. When the steel companies challenged
the seizure order in court, the Government relied on the President's
"inherent powers" under his constitutional authority as Com-
mander-in-Chief to support the Executive Order. The Supreme
Court rejected this position, finding that the President had at-
tempted to exercise legislative power when none had been dele-
No. 4, at 122, 164 (1976). See Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978); Jackson v. Metro-
politan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
47. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 3.
48. For a full discussion of possible statutory authority, see Part II. B. infra.
49. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. "[Iff it be true, [that broad language in article II
constitutes a grant of all the executive powers'of which the Government is capable,] it is
difficult to see why the forefathers bothered to add several specific items, including some
trifling ones." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 640-41 (1952) (Jack-
son, J., concurring).
50. Justice Jackson recognized the importance of this inquiry in Youngstown: "Presi-
dential claim to . . .power. . . must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is the
equilibrium established by our constitutional system." 343 U.S. at 638.
51. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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gated. Writing for the majority, Justice Black explained that "the
President's power to see that the laws are faithfully executed re-
futes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker. The Constitution limits
his function in the lawmaking process to the recommending of laws
he thinks wise and the vetoing of laws he thinks bad." 52 The flaw in
the President's Order was that it did "not direct that a congres-
sional policy be executed in a manner prescribed by Congress-it
direct[ed] that a Presidential policy be executed in a manner pre-
scribed by the President."5 By unilaterally framing a policy and
implementing it, the President had overstepped the bounds of his
constitutional authority. Justice Black's opinion makes it clear
that the scope of inherent executive power is extremely narrow.54 If
President Truman had no inherent power to act in the national in-
terest to avert a catastrophe during an emergency war situation,
then it seems highly unlikely that a President will be deemed to
have inherent power to remedy a chronic problem such as
discrimination. 5
It is important to distinguish between nondiscrimination and
affirmative action. The provisions in Executive Order 11,246 that
proscribe discrimination without requiring reverse discrimination
may be easier to justify than the affirmative action provisions. Be-
cause overt governmental complicity in private discriminatory con-
duct would be unconstitutional, executive safeguards insuring non-
discrimination in connection with governmental contracts are
constitutionally permissible. There is, of course, temptation to con-
fuse the issue of the validity of Presidential power with the merits
of the cause championed by the attempted exercise of that power."
52. Id. at 587.
53. Id. at 588.
54. For more recent decisions recognizing significant limitations on the President's
power to act unilaterally see New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971);
Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
55. The detailed scheme of conditions, procedures, and reporting requirements im-
posed on government contractors by Exec. Order No. 11,246 clearly envisions an extended
period of time to remedy the discrimination problem, strongly suggesting that the Executive
Order Program is designed to cure a chronic, not an emergency ailment. The scheme also
suggests that the Program's affirmative action provisions represent a Presidential, not a con-
gressional, policy, to be executed in a manner prescribed by the Executive, not authorized
by Congress. Under Youngstown no inherent constitutional authority supports such execu-
tive action.
56. Chief Justice Burger wisely avoided the temptation in his Weber dissent:
The Court reaches a result I would be inclined to vote for [i.e. upholding voluntary
affirmative action plans designed to eliminate past employment discrimination] were I
a Member of Congress considering a proposed amendment to Title VII. I cannot join
the Court's judgment, however, because it is contrary to the explicit language of the
statute and arrived at by a means wholly incompatible with long-established principles.
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When, as in the case of Order 11,246, the cause is worthy, the
temptation becomes particularly hard to resist. Confusion of these
issues, however, may upset the constitutional balance of power and
such disruption may in the long run prove harmful to the cause.
B. Statutory Sources of Authority
If the Executive Order is not based on an expressed or implied
or inherent constitutional grant of authority, it must, to be valid,
be issued pursuant to a statutory grant of such authority. Unlike
the early executive orders, Order 11,246 claimed no specific grant
of authority, but was issued simply "[u]nder and by virtue of the
authority vested in . . .[the] President of the United States by the
Constitution and statutes of the United States." As a result, in
dealing with challenges to the validity of the Order, courts have
attempted to unearth an appropriate statute or statutes that will
give color to the claim of power.
Two major circuit court decisions have located the requisite
authority in the President's procurement powers, arguing that the
increase in cost and time resulting from the exclusion of minority
members from government jobs is detrimental to the Government's
interests. In Contractors Association v. Secretary of Labor" the
Third Circuit considered a challenge to the Philadelphia Plan, one
of the "hometown plans" promulgated by the Secretary of Labor in
1969 pursuant to Executive Order No. 11,246 as a refinement of the
affirmative action program." Plaintiff construction contractors con-
tended that the Plan amounted to a piece of social legislation en-
acted by the President "without the benefit of statutory or consti-
tutional authority."'" While it recognized that Presidential power is
not unlimited, the court held that the President could, under the
procurement authority granted by statute, impose requirements
reasonably related to business interests of the Government. Accord-
ing to the court, the primary motivating force behind the affirma-
tive action program was not a concern for equal rights, but a desire
to increase the labor pool available for work on government con-
tracts. Thus, the court found a logical connection between the pur-
pose of Order 11,246 and the procurement authority.
Commentators have persuasively criticized Contractors Associ-
ation. First, Professor Morgan has pointed out that it is likely that
of separation of powers.
United Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. 2721, 2734 (1979).
57. 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971).
58. For a description of the Plan, see id. at 162-66.
59. Id. at 166.
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the President issued the order solely to achieve employment equal-
ity, rather than to increase the available labor force or to cut gov-
ernment procurement costs. 0 Second, Congress' only intention in
granting procurement powers to the President was to minimize in-
ternal bureaucratic procurement red tape.61 Even if Congress did
envision some sort of affirmative action under the procurement
power, it is difficult to justify the Executive Order Program as a
measure that insures economical and efficient procurement. Due to
the added expense to the contractors of undertaking the requisite
underutilization study, setting the necessary goals and timetables,
and seeing that they are carried out," the Order almost insures an
increase rather than a decrease in procurement costs for the federal
government. Even if the increased labor pool produced government
savings, the rationale would apply only to government purchase
contracts and not to sales contracts. Thus, the necessary nexus be-
tween the purported grant of statutory authority and the Order is
absent, setting the Order beyond the scope of presidential author-
ity. Third, commentators have attacked the Contractors Associa-
tion opinion as "too facile" on the ground that it does not deal
squarely with the central separation of powers issues. 3 The critics
contend that if Congress has already acted in the area to codify
federal policy and to prescribe the means for implementing it,
without specifically granting authority to the Executive also to act
in the area, then the President has no authority to act under
Youngstown. Thus, the court failed to deal with the fact that Con-
gress had indeed preempted the fair employment area by enacting
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.4
A second case, United States v. New Orleans Public Service,
Inc., 5 also found a statutory source of authority for the Executive
Order Program. The government brought an action to compel New
Orleans Public Service, Inc. (NOPSI), which sold energy to the
Government pursuant to contract, to comply with Executive Order
No. 11,246 regarding affirmative action. NOPSI argued that the
Order was executive action without authority from Congress and
60. Morgan, Achieving National Goals Through Federal Contracts: Giving Form to an
Unconstrained Administrative Process, 1974 Wis. L. REV. 301, 312.
61. Id. at 311.
62. See, e.g., 1 REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT 112 (1972):
"In a larger sense, it may be cost-effective for the Government and society at large to use the
leverage of the procurement process for achieving selected national objectives. It is doubtful
that such achievement is cost-effective for the procurement process itself."
63. Note, supra note 21, at 732.
64. See Part V. infra.
65. 553 F.2d 459 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 436 U.S. 942
(1978).
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therefore invalid. The Fifth Circuit followed the reasoning in Con-
tractors Association and declared that the Order had the "force
and effect of law.""6 Other courts, however, have been reluctant to
follow the Contractors Association lead. The court in Cramer v.
Virginia Commonwealth University argued, for example, that the
Third Circuit "seemed to accept the mandate of the Order by fiat
more than by reason or constitutional imperative. '6 7
Litigation involving other "hometown plans" has resulted in
decisions that appear to relax Contractors Association's require-
ment of at least a nexus between the purpose of the Oider and the
procurement authority of the President. Northeast Construction
Co. v. Romney," a challenge to the Washington Plan, and Rossetti
Contracting Co. v. Brennan," a challenge to the Chicago Plan,
have been interpreted as standing "for the proposition that equal
employment goals themselves, reflecting important national poli-
cies, validate the use of the procurement power in the context of
the Order. 70 The cases posit that in certain instances "social or
economic objectives [not on their face connected to procurement
objectives] may be sufficiently related to procurement considera-
tions in a broad sense and over the long run to validate use of the
procurement power by ... . the President."' Strictly speaking,
however, this proposition was offered as dicta, and the Northeast
court did not apply it directly to support the validity of the Order;
rather, to reach the Washington Plan issue, the court simply as-
sumed that the Executive Order Program was valid. Nevertheless,
the implication of the proposition dangerously attenuates the con-
stitutional nexus requirement between the Order and the purported
statutory authority for it. The danger is that such relaxed require-
ments have the effect of delegating to the President virtually un-
checked unilateral powers to formulate as well as implement social
policy.
IV. DEFINING THE LImrs OF EXEcUTIVE PowER
A. The Rationale for Narrowing Executive Power
Assuming arguendo that Contractors Association and North-
66. Id. at 465.
67. Cramer v. Virginia Commonwealth Univ., 415 F. Supp. 673, 680 (E.D. Va. 1976).
68. 485 F.2d 752 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
69. 508 F.2d 1039 (7th Cir. 1975).
70. United States v. New Orleans Pub. Servs. Inc., 553 F.2d 459, 467 (5th Cir. 1977),
vacated and remanded on other grounds, 436 U.S. 942 (1978) (emphasis supplied).
71. Northeast Const. Co. v. Romney, 485 F.2d 752, 760-61 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (emphasis
supplied).
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east are correct in finding authority for the Order based on the the-
ory that the procurement powers include the prerogative to fashion
social and economic policy, the task is twofold: to determine the
breadth of those social or economic policies, and to define the lim-
its of Presidential power in the fair employment area. Section 202
of Executive Order No. 11,246 inserts a "national goals clause" into
government contracts. The main purpose of the clause is the at-
tainment of nonprocurement objectives. 72 Although such a clause
may be a useful means of encouraging worthwhile ends, there are
several forceful arguments for restricting their imposition by uni-
lateral executive action. 3 There is often a lack of agreement on na-
tional objectives and how they should be implemented. While a
nondiscrimination clause may be beyond debate today, recent
cases illustrate" that affirmative action programs, preferential
treatment, and reverse discrimination are still controversial issues
rather than unanimous national goals. The determination that
such issues have become national goals is most appropriately
reached through the legislative process with its political safeguards.
The affirmative action program of Order 11,246, however, was uni-
laterally proclaimed by the President in the face of intense national
debate. The limits of such nonprocurement use of the procurement
power should be clearly defined to avoid abuse and to increase po-
litical accountability. It is particularly important to insure ac-
countability at the outset, for once the President has exercised
power in a given area, thereby mobilizing a constituency, it may
become increasingly" difficult for Congress to enact contrary
legislation.
Related to the problem of identifying national goals is the
problem of implementing conflicting national goals. To the extent
that nondiscrimination is an overriding policy concern, its potential
conflict with affirmative action requirements is great. The Execu-
tive Order Program encourages contractors to depart from strictly
neutral hiring practices (nondiscrimination) in order to meet the
necessary goals for hiring minority members. Contractors thus run
the risk of violating the antidiscrimination provisions of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 or even of the Executive Order itself.
The very nature of the problem outlined above both calls for
limits to Presidential power and at the same time suggests guide-
72. Morgan, supra note 60, at 302.
73. For a more detailed discussion, see id. at 304-06.
74. E.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Defunis v. Ode-
gaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974). See Falk, A Lid on Reverse Bias Suits?, Wall St. J., Oct. 1, 1979,
at 28, col. 2.
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lines for setting those limits. When public policy is a matter of na-
tional debate, various interest groups should air their conflicting
views in the national legislative forum, which provides public hear-
ings, open debates, and formal mechanisms that promote the legit-
imacy of the process. Unilateral executive action short-circuits the
typical political dynamic of the legislative arena.75 The legislative
process does not, of course, insure unanimity regarding any partic-
ular issue, but it does provide an opportunity for reaching a con-
sensus. The exercise of executive power, however, has the virtue of
flexibility and relative freedom from the constraints bf "process"
that may delay implementation of the policies. Specific delegation
of authority from Congress would retain this virtue while assuring
that the Executive acts without promulgating conflicting policies
and requirements.7"
B. The Nexus Approach
Three recent lines of authority reveal a trend toward limiting
the Executive's power to set social policy goals. These decisions
also provide a "nexus" framework for defining those limits that is
responsive to the problems discussed above. Although the trend is
discernible mainly in areas not directly related to Executive Order
No. 11,246, the analogy is nevertheless instructive.
In AFL-CIO v. Kahn77 plaintiff labor unions challenged the va-
lidity of Executive Order No. 12,092, in which President Carter re-
quired virtually all federal contractors to certify their compliance
with the voluntary wage and price guidelines established by the
Council on Wage and Price Stability." Treating the major issue as
one of separation of powers, the District Court found that the Or-
der was beyond the scope of presidential authority." The District of
75. An unreported New York Court of Appeals decision struck down executive orders
by Governor Carey and Mayor Beame requiring construction companies to establish hiring
programs that would increase the number of minority and women employees.
In ruling that the two officials had exceeded their authority, the court said "that the
desirability of adopting a policy of affirmative action in hiring practices, and mandating
the same, is not the prerogative of the executive, but rather of the legislative branch,
and it is to those bodies that persons seeking to impose affirmative action should direct
their attention. . . . The difficulty . . . is not the means employed by the executive to
impose affirmative action, but that the executive attempted it at all."
Daniels, Minority Hiring Ordered by State is Ruled Invalid, N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1979, § B
at 4, cols. 2-3.
76. See generally Note, A Proposal for Reconciling Affirmative Action with Nondis-
crimination Under the Contractor Antidiscrimination Program, 30 STAN. L. Rav. 803 (1978).
77. No. 79-1564 (D.C. Cir. June 22, 1979).
78. 43 Fed. Reg. 51,375 (1978).
79. AFL-CIO v. Kahn, No. 79-802 (D.D.C. May 31, 1979).
[Vol. 33:921
EXEC. ORDER NO. 11,246
Columbia Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, reversed, relying upon
statutory interpretation: "the central issue in this case is whether
the FPASA [Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of
1949, i.e., the Procurement Act] indeed grants to the President the
powers he has asserted."ss The court found that any executive order
based on the procurement powers must accord with the values of
"economy" and "efficiency" regarding government contracts. Order
No. 12,092 satisfied that requirement because its predominant ob-
jective and overall effect were to contain procurement costs. Conse-
quently, the court upheld the Order on the grounds that it was a
proper exercise of executive power pursuant to the FPASA grant of
authority "[b]ecause there is a sufficiently close nexus between
those critieria [of efficiency and economy] and the procurement
compliance program established by Executive Order 12092.",
Chief Judge Wright, writing for the court, repeatedly stressed the
importance of finding a nexus between the wage and price stan-
dards and the probable savings to the Government; he emphasized
that the majority's decision did "not write a blank check for the
President to fill in at his will. ' ' s2
The nexus requirement offers one standard for defining reason-
able, workable limits within which Presidential power may be exer-
cised pursuant to a grant of statutory authority. If a government
contractor challenged the validity of Order 11,246 in the D.C. Cir-
cuit, the court would apply intense scrutiny to ascertain whether
the affirmative action provisions were in fact consistent with the
structure and purposes of the Procurement Act. It is unlikely that
80. AFL-CIO v. Kahn, No. 79-1564, slip op. at 6 (D.C. Cir. June 22, 1979).
81. Id. at 16 (emphasis added).
82. Id. at 18. Judge Bazelon and Judge Tamm wrote separate concurring opinions to
highlight the narrowness of the holding:
I write only to emphasize the close nexus between the Order and the objectives of the
Procurement Act, and to underscore my understanding that nothing in the court's opin-
ion intimates any views on the validity of other Executive Orders issued explicitly or
implicitly pursuant to the authority granted by the Procurement Act ....
Id. (Bazelon, J., concurring).
Lest we later be construed as having broadly interpreted the Procurement Act, I write
separately only to emphasize my belief that the opinion we issue today is a narrow one.
It does not allow the President to exercise powers that reach beyond the Act's express
provisions. [It] ... is predicated upon the close nexus between the purposes of the
voluntary guidelines and the goal of the Act to secure economy and efficiency in federal
procurement.
Id. (Tamm, J., concurring).
Judge MacKinnon wrote a lengthy dissent in the Kahn case because he could "find no
license in the President's important but modest powers under the 1949 Act to support his
imposition of wage and price controls on federal government contractors." Id. (MacKinnon,
J., dissenting at 1). Judge MacKinnon advocates an even stricter nexus test than the one
applied by the Kahn majority.
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the affirmative action requirements could survive under the "close
nexus" test. 3
A line of Title IX cases" culminating in the 1979 Isleboro
School Committee v. Califano85 decision provides a second source
of precedent for narrowing the scope of executive power. Title IX of
the Education Amendments of 19726 proscribes sex discrimination
in any educational program activity receiving federal financial as-
sistance. Section 901 of Title IX makes it clear that the discrimina-
tion prohibitions are aimed at the beneficiaries of the federal mon-
ies-the students and teachers on federal grants. Although Title IX
does not expressly exclude employees qua employees it does not
expressly include them either. Title IX also authorizes HEW to is-
sue regulations to effectuate the mandate of section 901.11 Pursuant
to that statutory grant of authority, HEW promulgated regulations
requiring that in educational programs receiving federal funds em-
ployee pregnancy be treated as a compensable temporary disabil-
ity. When school districts denied paid sick leave to pregnant em-
ployees, the employees claimed a violation of Title IX. Courts
confronting challenges to the pregnancy regulations have unani-
mously held that the regulations overstep permissible bounds of ex-
ecutive power because the legislative history of Title IX indicates
that the section 901 provisions do not cover employees of federally
assisted programs. 8 Thus, the executive branch may not exceed
the scope of the congressionally granted authority by expanding
antidiscrimination provisions to cover a class of persons not con-
templated by Congress. 9 Instead of requiring a nexus between the
exercise of executive power and the statutory authority underlying
it, these cases appear to require an explicit statement of authoriza-
83. See text accompanying notes 60-71 supra.
84. Junior College Dist. v. Califano, 597 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1979); Islesboro School
Comm. v. Califano, 593 F.2d 424 (1st Cir. 1979), aft'g Brunswick School Bd. v. Califano, 449
F. Supp. 866 (S.D. Me. 1978); University of Toledo v. HEW, 464 F. Supp. 693 (N.D. Ohio
W.D. 1979); McCarthy v. Burkholder, 448 F. Supp. 41 (D. Kan. 1978); Seattle Univ. v.
HEW, 16 Empl. Prac. Dec. 5243 (W.D. Wash. 1978); Romeo Community Schools v. HEW,
438 F. Supp. 1021 (E.D. Mich. 1977), aff'd, 600 F.2d 581 (6th Cir. 1979).
85. 593 F.2d 424 (1st Cir. 1979).
86. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1976).
87. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1976).
88. See note 84 supra.
89. In a 1978 amendment to Title VII, Congress mandated that pregnancy not be
treated differently than other disabilities. Act of Oct. 31, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat.
2076 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)). It is interesting to note that HEW's Title IX
regulations on pregnancy went well beyond the requirements of equal opportunity under Ti-
tle VII. In General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), the Supreme Court held that
exclusions of pregnancies from private disability plans were not illegal. The 1978 law, in
effect, overruled General Electric.
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tion for any given exercise of Presidential power-even stricter lim-
its than in Kahn." If the reasoning in these cases were applied
analogously to a case challenging the validity of the affirmative ac-
tion provisions of Executive Order No. 11,246, the result probably
would be the invalidation of those provisions for want of proper
statutory authority under the Procurement Act.
The third precedential line of authority emerges by analogy to
the state action cases, in which a nexus requirement has narrowed
the concept of state action. Because the prohibitions of the four-
teenth amendment" apply only to states, and not to purely private
activity, courts must distinguish between governmental involve-
ment in private action and unconnected private conduct. Attempt-
ing to make this distinction, Justice Rehnquist articulated the
state action nexus requirement in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison
Co." Under Jackson, if a nexus can be established between the
challenged activity and the state, then the fourteenth amendment
will apply. Deeming a given act "state action" only when such a
nexus exists permits unrelated activity by a private party to re-
main private, untouched by the procedural and substantive re-
quirements of the fourteenth amendment. The nexus test also
avoids the pitfall of assuming that application of the fourteenth
amendment to the private activity of one group in a particular sit-
uation requires that the amendment be applied to all groups in all
situations. The analogous trap in the Executive Order No. 11,246
context is the assumption that, because courts have upheld previ-
ous executive orders as valid exercises of the President's procure-
ment power, this Order must also be valid. Unfortunately, the
court in Contractors Association failed to see the fallacy in this as-
sumption. 3 Moreover, the Jackson nexus analysis suggests that
90. In dicta the Islesboro court implied that it might countenance a nexus theory ex-
tension of Title IX requirements in the proper case. The implication arose because HEW
argued an "infection theory" to support its exercise of power. It claimed that Title IX pros-
cribes employment-related discrimination when that discrimination infects the beneficiaries
(i.e. students) of the program. The court responded by reasoning that such a theory would
only work when there is a nexus between the discrimination against the employees and its
effect on the students.
It is interesting to note that the Executive appears to be unaware of, or has chosen to
ignore, the clear limits set by these cases on executive power under Title IX. In Reorganiza-
tion Plan No. 1 of 1978, 7 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 9795, 9798 (1978), President Carter
stated that one benefit of the Plan would be to "see that a university's employment practices
are not subject to duplicative investigations under both Title IX of the Education Amend-
ments of 1972 and the contract compliance program." The case law clearly has rejected the
notion that Title IX has any application to employment practices.
91. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
92. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
93. 442 F.2d 159, 170-71 (1971).
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President Johnson's expansion of the scope of the executive order
to cover all of a government contractor's operations is an unwar-
ranted expansion of the procurement power into unrelated private
activities.
A recent Supreme Court decision deals specifically with Exec-
utive Order No. 11,246 in the context of the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act and suggests the applicability of the nexus approach to
the Executive Order Program." Chrysler Corporation objected
when certain third parties requested publication of its affirmative
action program records. The Office of Federal Contract Compliance
Programs (OFCCP) regulations promulgated pursuant to Order
11,246 allow disclosure sought by third parties, notwithstanding the
exemptions under the Freedom of Information Act. Chrysler main-
tained, however, that the Freedom of Information and Trade
Secrets Acts, which impose criminal sanctions for disclosures "not
authorized by law," barred disclosure of the records. Thus, the
question was whether the affirmative action plan developed pursu-
ant to the Executive Order Program was or was not "authorized by
law." The Court agreed with Chrysler, finding that disclosure of
the affirmative action plan was not authorized by law. In so hold-
ing, the Court reasoned that, in order for regulations adopted under
section 201 of the Order to have the "force and effect of law," there
must be some "nexus between the regulations and some delegation
of the requisite legislative authority by Congress."9 The Court
.found no nexus because when Congress enacted Titles VI and VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, or the Procurement Act, which ar-
guably authorized the Executive Order, it was not concerned with
the disclosure authority claimed by the Government. Thus, the
Court's application of the nexus analysis to Executive Order No.
11,246 in Chrysler, albeit only in the disclosure context, suggests
that the analysis may also be appropriate for testing the very valid-
ity of the Order in its present scope.
In sum, these recent lines of authority suggest that there is
precedent for narrowing the scope of Presidential power. More sig-
nificantly, they suggest that the nexus approach is workable and
manageable. It prevents the President from implementing his own
policy without the safeguards of the legislative process and yet pre-
serves the flexibility and ease of the executive order as a device for
implementing congressionally established policies. It insures that
the Executive will neither ignore congressional intent, nor bend it
94. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 99 S. Ct. 1705 (1979).
95. Id. at 1719.
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to some unrelated purpose. It is not an arbitrary definition of the
limits of power, but rather an approach logically conceived to lead
to the desired end. Finally, the test has proved useful and workable
in a variety of situations analogous to the Executive Order Program
context."
V. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN EXECUTIVE ORDER No. 11,246 AND THE
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964: REFOCUSING THE INQUIRY
A. Overview of the Controversy: Justice Jackson's Three
Categories Revisited
The potential for conflict between the provisions of the Exec-
tive Order Program and those of Title VII is troublesome. 7 The
relevant provisions of Title VII prohibit racial and gender-based
discrimination in employment. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co."s the
Supreme Court interpreted those provisions to proscribe discrimi-
natory preference as well. More recently the Court found it "clear
beyond cavil that the obligation imposed by Title VII is to provide
an equal opportunity for each applicant regardless of race, without
regard to whether members of the applicant's race are already pro-
portionately represented in the work force."" At this point the Ex-
ecutive Order Program collides with Title VII. By mandating af-
firmative action goals and timetables, the Executive Order
Program encourages preferential treatment of minorities by govern-
ment contractors. Those who do comply with the program, how-
ever, are subject to suit under the antidiscrimination provisions of
Title VII. 100 This conflict is a significant factor in determining the
validity of Executive Order No. 11,246. This Note argues that there
is no statutory authority for the issuance of the affirmative action
orders. If, however, one assumes arguendo that the Order was is-
sued pursuant to a valid grant of authority under the Procurement
Act, that should not end the inquiry. It is one thing to say that the
96. Specifically, the analogous situations are found in the Title IX cases and state
action cases.
97. See Morgan, supra note 60; Note, Employment Discrimination-Weber v. Kaiser
Aluminum & Chemical Corp.: Does Title VII Limit Executive Order 11246?, 57 N.C. L. REv.
695 (1979); Note, Executive Order 11,246 and Reverse Discrimination Challenges: Presiden-
tial Authority to Require Affirmative Action, 54 N.Y.U. L. REv. 377, 385-95 (1979); Note,
supra note 21; Comment, supra note 38, at 482-87.
98. 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971).
99. Furnco Const. Corp. v. Waters, 98 S. Ct. 2943, 2951 (1978).
100. Since Weber was decided on the assumption that the preferential program at is-
sue was voluntary, it is still possible that involuntary compliance with the Executive Order
Program would bring about a different result. See United Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 S. Ct.
2721, 2730 & n.9 (1979).
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general power to act has been validly granted; it is another thing to
say that the power has been validly exercised.
Whenever the federal government acts, three major questions
arise in analyzing the validity of the action. First, is there a source
of authority for the act? Second, is the act in fact an exercise of
power not exceeding the scope of the delegated authority? Third, is
there any independent limitation that would thwart the exercise of
that power? For example, Congress acted in 1974 to extend the fed-
eral minimum wage and maximum hour provisions of the Fair La-
bor Standards Act to most state and municipal employees."°' When
the validity of that act was challenged in National League of Cities
v. Usery,02 the first question was whether Congress had any au-
thority to legislate in that general area. The source of authority
clearly was the commerce clause. The second question was whether
the specific legislation exceeded the scope of the source of author-
ity. The Court found that the legislation was "undoubtedly within
the scope of the Commerce Clause"'0 3 and could validly be applied
to private industry. Nevertheless, the Court invalidated the exten-
sion of the provisions to state and local government employees,
holding that the tenth amendment ' 4 was an affirmative limitation
on federal power, and prohibited congressional impairment of sov-
ereign state functions.
The same three-step analysis should be applied to determine
the validity of the affirmative action provisions of the Executive
Order Program. This analysis is a different articulation of the
framework provided by Justice Jackson in Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer.'15 Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in
Youngstown sets forth three contexts in which presidential actions
may be tested for validity:' 6
1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied au-
thorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum ....
2. When the President acts in the absence of either a congres-
sional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely on his own indepen-
dent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress
101. Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 6(a)(1), (5), (6), 88 Stat. 58 (1974) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §
203(d), (s), (x) (1976)).
102. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
103. Id. at 841.
104. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohib-
ited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S.
CONsT. amend. X.
105. 343 U.S. 579, 635-38 (1952). It should be noted that the three steps of the analysis
do not correspond one for one with Justice Jackson's three categories. Rather, the three steps
in the aggregate address the same questions addressed by Justice Jackson's categories.
106. Id.
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may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain.
Therefore, congressional inertia, indifference, or quiescence may some-
times, at least as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on
independent presidential responsibility. In this area, any actual test of
power is likely to depend on the imperatives of events and contempo-
rary imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law.
3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the ex-
press or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then
he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitu-
tional powers of Congress over the matter.
Commentators traditionally have interpreted Justice Jackson's
three categories as alternative and mutually exclusive. Thus,
viewed traditionally, if a Presidential act falls into category one no
further inquiry is necessary; the act is valid. The only justifiable
conclusion, however, is that the act is or is not authorized-that
the President has or lacks authority to act pursuant to a particular
congressional mandate. Similarly, if an act fits into category two,
the issue is whether, absent relevant legislation, the President de-
rives authority implicitly or explicitly from the Constitution itself.
Categories one and two taken together address the question of
whether there is a source of either legislative or constitutional au-
thority to warrant Presidential action. Category three addresses a
fundamentally different question: whether the specific exercise of
power, though authorized, violates a specific constitutional or stat-
utory limitation on executive power. Thus, in judging a particular
act, category three becomes relevant only after authority is found
under either category one or two. For example, the Procurement
Act may authorize the President to purchase from low-cost suppli-
ers. It is obvious, however, that under such authority a President
could not eliminate all contractors of a single race, even if he found
that they typically were more expensive. Other statutory and con-
stitutional limitations would bar that exercise of executive power.
Therefore, the three categories are not conceptual alternatives;
rather, they constitute a cumulative analytical framework, like the
three-step analysis in Usery. If analysis under categories one or two
shows that the President had authority to act, then it still must be
determined whether the exercise of that power clashes with another
statutory or constitutional policy. If the President did indeed act
within the scope of the authorization, then the question is whether
such exercise conflicts with and is thus limited by any existing
legislation."°7
107. This reading of the Jackson concurrence in Youngstown helps explain what many
commentators have found enigmatic about that decision. Justice Black wrote the majority
opinion, which focused exclusively on the source of authority issue. He narrowly delimited
the scope of Presidential power, concluding that no legislative or constitutional mandate
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Application of this analysis to Executive Order No. 11,246 il-
lustrates that even if the Order were authorized by the Procure-
ment Act,' 8 its validity is nevertheless questionable. This conclu-
sion derives from application of the third criterion under the
proffered analysis-whether the Order conflicts with any existing
legislation.'0 ' Courts and commentators have consistently focused
on Title VII in answering this question. Ultimately, such focus
proves too restrictive to provide any definitive answer. Neverthe-
less, because the inquiry had produced misguided results, it is
worthwhile to re-examine the conflict between the Order and Title
VII. It must be underscored at the outset that the following discus-
sion acknowledges that there is no conflict between the nondiscrim-
ination provisions of the Order and Title VII. Title VII simply pro-
hibits discrimination in employment and specifies that courts
should not interpret it "to require any employer . . . to grant pref-
erential treatment to any individual or to any group because of
race . . . on account of an imbalance which may exist" between
percentages of minority members in the available work force and
minority members actually employed.110 If President Johnson had
not expanded the Order by requiring affirmative action programs,
courts would probably find that the Executive acted pursuant to an
implicit legislative grant of authority under Title VII itself. By re-
quiring a nondiscrimination clause in federal contracts, the Execu-
tive Order would be nothing more than an implementation of the
Title VII provisions. The affirmative action program, however, not
only expands the scope of the Order tremendously, but also exceeds
the limits of any authority granted by Title VII.
existed for Presidential seizure of the steel mills and ended his inquiry there. Justice Jackson
joined the opinion of the Court, but also wrote a concurring opinion in which he articulated
his three categories. Justice Jackson interpreted the legislative history to mean that Con-
gress had explicitly opposed Presidential seizure of private property during national emer-
gency labor disputes. He pointed out that, in order to sustain President Truman's action,
the Court would not only have to find a source of Presidential power, but also reach a con-
clusion that the President's inherent power prevailed over a conflicting legislative judgment.
Therefore, a ruling to support the seizure of the steel mills would mean that Congress was
unable to countermand the President's action.
This Note's reading of Justice Jackson's opinion eliminates any methodological conflict
between the approaches of Justices Black and Jackson in Youngstown. Justice Black limited
himself to the source of power issue; he never considered the limitation problem. Justice
Jackson's concern over the limitation problem led him to join the majority because it
pretermitted the sticky limitation problem by narrowing the scope of Presidential authority.
Courts and commentators most often use Justice Jackson's analytical framework because, of
the Youngstown opinions, it alone openly addresses the limitation issue.
108. As discussed above, however, this Note maintains that the Order was not author-
ized under the Procurement Act. See Section IV. B. supra.
109. See Section V. C. infra.
110. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1976).
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B. The Traditional Analysis: The Executive Order Program vs.
Title VII
Courts and commentators traditionally have used three major
arguments to support a finding that the Executive Order Program
does not conflict with the provisions of Title VII. First, section
703(j) has been intepreted to mean that the Act does not "require"
an employer to engage in preferential treatment of applicants or
employees.' Second, the legislative history, as discussed in United
Steelworkers v. Weber, ' supports the view that the Order is com-
patible with Title VII. Third, one theory of ratification suggests
that congressional inaction since 1965 has retroactively authorized
the Executive Order Program. The Weber decision, which exten-
sively examined the first two points, will serve as the focus for
analysis. A separate examination of the ratification concept follows
the Weber discussion.
(1) The Weber Decision
In Weber the United Steelworkers Union and Kaiser Alumi-
num entered into a master collective bargaining agreement that in-
cluded a provision for an explicitly race-conscious affirmative ac-
tion plan "to eliminate conspicuous racial imbalances in Kaiser's
then almost exclusively white craft work forces." ' 3 The agreement
established Black hiring goals for each plant and reserved fifty per-
cent of the places in job training programs for Black employees. A
white employee of Kaiser alleged that Blacks with less seniority
were filling the training slots and that the plan discriminated
against him in violation of Title VII, which barred race discrimina-
tion in the selection of apprentices for training programs. Prior case
law had determined that the civil rights law prohibits discrimina-
tion against whites."4 Thus, the employee argued that an affirma-
tive action program that discriminated against whites solely on the
basis of race violated Title VII.
Although conceding that the "argument is not without force,"
the majority found that the white employee's position "over-
look[ed] the significance of the fact that the Kaiser . . . plan is an
affirmative action plan voluntarily adopted by private parties to
111. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. 2721, 2724 (1979) (interpreting 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(j) (1976)).
112. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. 2721 (1979).
113. Id. at 2725.
114. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); Mc-
Donald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
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eliminate traditional patterns of racial segregation."115 For the ma-
jority, the only question was the "narrow statutory issue of whether
Title VII forbids private employers and unions from voluntarily
agreeing upon bona fide affirmative action plans that accord racial
preferences in the manner and for the purposes provided in the
Kaiser . . . plan.""' After superficial examination of the language
and legislative history of Title VII, the majority concluded that the
antidiscrimination provisions did not bar such voluntary, race-con-
scious affirmative action plans. Moreover, although section 703(j)
provided that nothing contained in Title VII "shall be interpreted
to require" affirmative efforts to correct racial imbalances, the
Court found that the language would permit voluntary efforts. Jus-
tice Brennan concluded that "[tihe natural inference is that Con-
gress chose not to forbid all voluntary race-conscious affirmative
action.""'
It is not surprising that the Court relegated the executive order
issue to a terminal footnote, indicating that it would not consider
Kaiser's "contention that their affirmative action plan represented
an attempt to comply with Executive Order 11,246."11 It seems
115. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. 2721, 2726 (1979).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 2729. The Court's approach in Weber was an exercise in dissimulation, for
the Court treated Kaiser's quota program as voluntarily adopted. Id. at 2726. Justice Bren-
nan, writing for the majority, took the position that the legislative history of Title VII makes
it clear that Congress did not intend to prohibit all race-conscious affirmative action. The
majority found that the primary concern of Congress was to ameliorate the "plight of the
Negro in our economy." Id. at 2727 (quoting 110 CONG. REc. 6548 (Remarks of Sen
Humphrey)). Accordingly, the object of the legislation was to open employment opportuni-
ties to Blacks in the occupations traditionally closed to them. Thus, the majority concluded
that a law triggered by the desire to eliminate discrimination and to improve the lot of those
previously discriminated against cannot be a legislative prohibition on affirmative action. 99
S. Ct. at 2727.
In a dissent joined by Chief Justice Burger, Justice Rehnquist traced the legislative
history in great detail, concluding that Title VII prohibits all racial discrimination in em-
ployment without exception. Justice Rehnquist agreed with previous cases holding that Title
VII protects whites as well as Blacks from certain forms of racial discrimination. Id. at 2736
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist pointed out that some sponsors of Title VII
favored a provision allowing preferential treatment for minorities, and that their remarks
are, of course, part of the legislative history. One can quote those views out of context to
bolster Justice Brennan's line of reasoning. In reality, the Act is the result of compromise,
and the legislative history demonstrates that the prime motivating concern of Congress was
not preference for the economic welfare of any one group, but a concern for the principle of
equality. Congress added Section 703(j) in an attempt to end the dispute about preferential
treatment-a compromise necessary to pass the Act. Justice Rehnquist's presentation of the
legislative history is clear, complete, detailed, and balanced. His analysis is persuasive; the
legislative history of the Civil Rights Act clearly supports the proposition that Title VII pros-
cribes preferential treatment in the employment arena.
118. Id. at 2730 n.9. Presumably, the effect of the mandatory nature of the Executive
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clear, however, that Kaiser's participation in the affirmative action
agreement was not motivated solely by altruistic concerns for the
betterment of its Black workers. Rather, it reflected a realistic pro-
phylactic adopted to comply with the dictates of the Executive Or-
der Program and to avoid endangering its retention of lucrative
governmental contracts.11' Nevertheless, the Court sustained the
race-conscious quota in Weber on the narrow ground that it was
the product of a private choice to effectuate a social policy that
Congress neither mandated nor condemned.
In light of Weber, the affirmative action provisions of the Ex-
ecutive Order Program are highly problematic. Justice Brennan
emphasized that support for Title VII came from those "who tradi-
tionally resisted federal regulation of private business" and who
"demanded as a price for their support that 'management preroga-
tives and union freedoms . . . be left undisturbed to the greatest
extent possible.' "120 As the majority in Weber acknowledged, sec-
tion 703(j) "was designed to prevent § 703 of Title VII from being
interpreted in such a way as to lead to undue 'Federal Government
interference with private business because of some Federal em-
ployee's ideas about racial balance or imbalance.' "1 In the con-
text of Weber, in which the Court characterized the affirmative ac-
tion program as voluntary, these arguments may suggest that Title
VII does not prohibit all such private sector managerial decision-
making. With respect to the affirmative action requirements of the
Executive Order, however, it seems clear after Weber that the type
of race-consciousness imposed by the federal government on pri-
vate contractors is in conflict with the language and the policies of
Title VII. The affirmative commands of the Executive Order reflect
precisely the kind of governmental meddling with private sector
managerial decisionmaking that the Court feared in Weber. The
Court's reasoning in Weber is powerful evidence that the terms of
the Executive Order, which require the establishment of race-con-
scious goals and timetables, are in conflict with the plain meaning
of Title VII. They do not come within the Weber exception for vol-
untary affirmative action. In short, proponents of race-conscious
employment programs have won only a pyrrhic victory because
Weber, if read and followed with integrity, is conclusive that the
Order Program on Title VII-left open by Weber-rmust be raised either by a defiant con-
tractor or one that complies involuntarily with the Program and asserts his involuntary com-
pliance as the sole justification for a race-conscious employment program.
119. Id. at 2737-38 n.2 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 2729 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. Pt. 2, at 29 (1963)).
121. 99 S. Ct. at 2729 (quoting 110 CONG. REc. 14,314 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Miller)).
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Executive Order Program, as a governmentally imposed program,
conflicts with Title VII.
(2) The Ratification Concept
Proponents of the ratification concept concede that the affirm-
ative action program conflicts with Title VII, but argue that Con-
gress subsequently has ratified the Executive Order Program. For
example, in the process of passing the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Act of 1972,22 which amended the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
the Senate considered and rejected an amendment that would have
specifically prohibited the use of goals or quotas by government
agencies. Several courts and commentators have interpreted this
rejection as an implicit ratification of the affirmative action
program.'m
Although ratification would be proper if Congress, in express
recognition of the conflict between the Executive Order Program
and Title VII, affirmatively exempted the Program from the con-
straints of Title VII, '124 there are strong policy reasons for rejecting
ratification by inaction in the legislative context. The legislative
process is designed to protect the notions of open and accountable
procedures and majority rule as the foundation of democracy. For
this reason the legislative process places the burden of passing bills
by majority vote on the proponents of the particular piece of legis-
lation.12- Under the theory of ratification by inaction, however, any
unsuccessful attempt to defeat or modify the Executive Order Pro-
gram would be tantamount to an imprimatur of that Program.
Such a reading improperly shifts the burden of amassing a major-
ity from the proponents to the opponents of the legislation. It may
also cause serious opponents to refrain from open opposition if the
result of unsuccessful opposition is ratification of a Presidential
program. 2
122. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976).
123. Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 563 F.2d 216, 220 (5th Cir. 1977),
rev'd on other grounds, 99 S. Ct. 2721 (1979). See also Note, supra note 21, at 756.
124. Chief Justice Vinson in his Youngstown dissent reviews several instances in which
Congress has by express enactments ratified prior unauthorized acts of the Executive.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 683-86 (1952).
125. For example, if the President sent a treaty to the Senate for ratification, and
Senate opponents introduced a bill opposing the terms of the treaty, failure to pass the bill
would not be equivalent to Senate ratification of the treaty.
126. The ratification by inaction doctrine encourages supporters of Presidential action
to introduce legislation with the express hope of its defeat in order to secure this form of
approval. Such a result is a perversion of the legislative process and would chill the political
process.
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In sum, the Executive Order Program requires race-based and
gender-based goals and timetables that induce preferential treat-
ment in employment practices by government contractors. This
Program directly conflicts with the "no discrimination" language of
Title VII. The Supreme Court's reasoning in Weber has foreclosed
attempts to harmonize the two sets of provisions. The ratification
doctrine should not be applied to create legislative authority for
the Program because such application would distort separation of
powers. Thus, the Executive Order conflicts with congressional ac-
tion in the same field and falls into Justice Jackson's third cate-
gory. Even if the Procurement Act is a statutory source of authority
for the issuance of Executive Order No. 11,246, the affirmative ac-
tion program is invalid because it impinges upon an independent
statutory policy.'
C. A New Analytical Approach: The Executive Order Program
vs. Title VI
Courts and commentators traditionally have discussed only
the inconsistency between Executive Order 11,246 and Title VII,
considering Title VI of the Civil Rights Act 2 ' only in the determi-
nation of whether Title VI specifically grants authority to the Pres-
ident to issue the Order. It is now well settled that neither Title VII
nor Title VI contains an express substantive delegation of authority
to the President. 9 If one assumes that the authority to issue the
Order comes from some other statutory source, then Title VI must
also be considered in an analysis of conflicts between the Order and
existing legislation. Indeed, in structure Title VI is more closely
analogous to the Executive Order Program than is Title VII. Any
conflict between Title VI and the Order places the Order in Justice
Jackson's third category and severely jeopardizes the Order's
validity.
Title VI prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color,
religion, or national origin in any program or activity receiving
127. Justice Jackson's category three in Youngstown recognizes that in some rare cases
the Executive will be able to rely on his own constitutional powers for authority even if his
actions are incompatible with existing legislation. 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952). Myers v. United
States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926), is an example of such a case. Exec. Order No. 11,246, however,
does not present such a case because, as this Note demonstrates, the Order does not rest on
any independent constitutional authorization.
128. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-4 (1976).
129. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 99 S. Ct. 1705, 1719-20 (1979); Contractors Ass'n v. Sec-
retary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159, 173 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971).
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federal financial assistance. 10 Under Title VI federal agencies have
the power to promulgate rules consistent with the achievement of
the statutory objective of nondiscrimination, and failure to comply
may result in a cutoff of federal funds."' Federal financial assis-
tance under Title VI may be in the form of a grant, a loan, or a
contract,"2 but section 604 specifically exempts "any employment
practice of any employer" from the foregoing provisions.'33 Title VI
implements a policy of fairness to every individual, not one of em-
ployment preference for members of minority groups.
Viewed against the structure of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
the Executive Order Program is more closely analogous to Title VI
than to Title VII. A government contract is a form of federal
financial assistance under Title VI; both Title VI and the Execu-
tive Order Program use the funds-cutoff mechanism for enforcing a
social policy.'34 By virtue of the sanctions listed in section 209(a) of
the Order, the Secretary of Labor may cancel, terminate, or sus-
pend the contracts of noncomplying contractors and/or stipulate
that all federal agencies refrain from further contracting with that
employer. The net effect of the imposition of these sanctions is not
necessarily to redress the acts of discrimination that have occurred,
but rather to cut off the flow of federal funds to private employers
because of certain employment practices-a result that section 604
of Title VI expressly prohibits. If Title VI did not expressly exclude
the employment area from its coverage, the Order would simply
implement the policies set by Congress. Congress has, however, ex-
pressly exempted employment from the coverage of Title VI. Since
the Executive Order Program has in effect extended the provisions
of Title VI to employment, the Program is in conflict with Title VI.
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 confined employment discrimination
claims largely to the realm of private enforcement and explicitly
withdrew from the federal arsenal the use of the funds-cutoff tech-
nique in employment discrimination cases. Focusing on the struc-
ture of the Civil Rights Act-distinguishing the scope of coverage
and the method of enforcement of Titles VI and VII-clearly dem-
onstrates the basic incompatibility of the Executive Order Program
with the Civil Rights Act. Consequently, the Executive Order con-
130. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976).
131. Id. § 2000d-1.
132. Id.
133. Id. § 2000d-3.
134. The Program specifies that certain sanctions may be imposed if employers receiv-
ing federal funds pursuant to a government contract breach any of the contractural require-
ments of the equal employment opportunity clause. 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.26(a) (1979).
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flicts with existing legislation and is therefore an improper exercise
of executive power.
VI. CONCLUSION
The controversy over the desirability of race-conscious employ-
ment programs is a continuing one. The federal affirmative action
program is unique, however, because the executive branch has im-
posed the program pursuant to an executive order, the validity of
which is open to serious question. This Note has attempted to
demonstrate that the constitutional and statutory underpinnings
for the Executive Order Program are questionable on several
grounds.
First, the Note has demonstrated that the concept of affirma-
tive action as embodied in the Executive Order Program induces
race-conscious employment programs by federal contractors in con-
trast to the norm of race-neutral decisionmaking imposed by the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Note has also argued that a nexus
analysis must define the parameters of executive authority to pro-
mulgate the Executive Order Program. In other words, there must
be a close relationship between the alleged source of executive au-
thority and the President's actual exercise of that authority. State
action decisions narrowing the concept of governmental responsibil-
ity for private conduct support such a reading. Several recent cir-
cuit court decisions also support application of a nexus approach
by limiting the executive branch's ability to regulate employment
practices in federally funded programs that benefit students, not
faculty members. Similarly, in upholding the federal contractor
compliance provisions of President Carter's wage and price guide-
lines, the D.C. Circuit carefully narrowed its approval of executive
authority on the ground that the federal procurement legislation
bore a close relationship to the provisions of the wage and price
order. These cases suggest the desirability of delimiting Presiden-
tial power by applying a strict nexus test.
Second, this Note attempts to refine the Presidential power
analysis of Youngstown Steel and to reconcile the opinions of Jus-
tices Black and Jackson. The Note argues that finding a source for
Presidential power (whether statutory or constitutional) and deter-
mining whether there are independent limits on Presidential
power, are two distinct issues. Going beyond Justice Black's discus-
sions of Presidential authority, Justice Jackson suggested that au-
thorized Presidential power may still conflict with separately ex-
isting legislative or constitutional prohibitions on the exercise of
Presidential power. Justice Jackson's third category provides a
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framework of analysis for situations in which a source of executive
power exists, but arguably conflicts with some other legislative or
constitutional mandate. The Note contends that even if arguendo
the federal procurement power authorizes the Executive Order Pro-
gram, the Program conflicts with the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Third, the Note utilizes the recent decision in United Steel-
workers v. Weber as a vehicle for discussing the incompatibility of
Title VII with the provisions of the Executive Order Program. In
sustaining a race-conscious job training quota program, the Court
carved out an exception from Title VIl's race-neutral language to
permit voluntary affirmative action programs. The Weber court
construed Title VII to permit private managerial decisions with re-
spect to fair employment matters, with the sole proviso that pri-
vate employers could not discriminate on the basis of race or sex.
By narrowing its justification for race-conscious programs to those
entered voluntarily, the Court in Weber implicitly found that the
race-conscious provisions of the Executive Order Program, which
are imposed mandatorily on private contractors by the federal gov-
ernment, are inconsistent with the general nondiscrimination pro-
visions of Title VII. Since the only basis for permitting racial hiring
quotas in Weber was that they were voluntary, it seems to follow a
fortiori that an employer who resists adopting race-conscious em-
ployment practices, but who is required to do so as a federal con-
tractor by the OFCCP, would have a good argument that the Exec-
utive Order violated the terms of Title VII. Thus, Weber, albeit
inadvertently, is perhaps the strongest case for the proposition that
the Executive Order Program is in conflict with Title VII.
Finally, this Note argues that the best structural analogue to
the Executive Order Program is Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 because both use the threat of a federal funds-cutoff as their
primary enforcement mechanism. The federal funds-cutoff is a ma-
jor weapon in the fight against discrimination under Title VI, but
section 604 explicitly withdraws that extremely potent weapon
from the federal government's arsenal in the area of employment
discrimination, leaving the terms and procedures of Title VII as the
exclusive remedy for claims of employment discrimination.
In Executive Order No. 11,246, however, the President has
seemingly defied the express terms of section 604 by applying the
funds-cutoff tool to employment discrimination matters. While
limited use of this tool may be acceptable under the President's
responsibility to execute the nondiscrimination laws, the far-reach-
ing affirmative action provisions of the Executive Order conflict
both with the plain language of section 604 and with the entire
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structural scheme of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Because of the tenuousness of the President's authority to is-
sue the affirmative action provisions of the Executive Order Pro-
gram, and because of the conflict of the Program with the provi-
sions of Titles VI and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the
constitutional validity of the Presidential Program is subject to se-
rious doubt on separation of powers grounds.
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